Deleuze describes Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* as ‘the narrative of an apprenticeship’ (Deleuze 2000: 3). In Deleuze’s reading, the narrator, Marcel, is engaged in an apprenticeship in signs, whereby he comes to understand first the signs of the world, then the signs of love and the signs of involuntary memory, and finally the signs of art. At times Marcel looks to others, like Swann or Charlus, to guide him in this apprenticeship, but they prove to be unreliable teachers. If Marcel has any teachers at all, they are the signs themselves.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze expands a bit further on the relation between signs and learning, saying that ‘learning [l’apprentissage] takes place . . . in the relation between a sign and a response [encounter with the Other]’ (Deleuze 1994: 22). To learn, says Deleuze, is ‘to enter into the universal of the relations which constitute the Idea, and into their corresponding singularities’ (1994: 165). As an example of this engagement with the Idea and its corresponding singularities, Deleuze considers the process of learning to swim in the sea. Following Leibniz, he states that the Idea of the sea ‘is a system of liaisons or differential relations between particles and singularities corresponding to the degrees of variation among these relations – the totality of the system being incarnated in the real movement of the waves’ (1994: 165; translation modified). To learn to swim is to create an interface between the ‘distinctive [remarquable] points of our bodies’ and the singular points of the sea. The physical sea is the object emitting signs, and it is a multiplicity of wave movements; the signs emitted constitute a system of connections or differential relations between particles (the Idea) and corresponding singular points, or degrees of variation among the differential relations; and the response to the signs involves the physical body of the swimmer, which engages the complex of the sea’s system and its singular points via the body’s own ‘distinctive points’ (‘distinctive points’, in my reading,
being simply a synonym for ‘singular points’). The body’s movements do not resemble the sea’s movements, but instead form a heterogeneous multiplicity responsive to an encounter with the sea as an ‘other’ heterogeneity.

It is within this complex relation between the multiplicities of the body and the sea that the teacher attempts to intervene. The ‘swimming instructor [maître-nageur]’ (Deleuze 1994: 23) perhaps initiates instruction by demonstrating strokes while standing on the shore, and then having the learner imitate the strokes. But such instruction is useless, since there is no relation between the mock-swimming on land and actual swimming in the sea. Only when the swimmer’s body interacts with the waves of the sea can swimming begin, and it is the encounter between wave-signs and the responding body movements that does the teaching. Hence, ‘we learn nothing from those who say: “Do as I do”. Our only teachers [maîtres] are those who tell us to “do with me”, and are able to emit signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce’ (1994: 23). Genuine teachers, it turns out, are simply emitters of heterogeneous signs that help students encounter other heterogeneous signs. In learning to swim, then, whether the signs are emitted by the sea or by the genuine maître, the signs themselves are the teachers.

At first glance, this characterisation of teaching seems to minimise the role of the teacher. Basically, the maître-nageur says, ‘let’s jump in the sea and start swimming’, at which point the sea does the teaching. One might ask whether there is really any need for a maître-nageur at all, and whether the apprentice, like Marcel, might as well learn on her own. In part this portrait of the teacher as humble assistant is strategic, in that Deleuze is countering the orthodox image of the teacher as all-powerful master, the one who knows, the one who poses the questions and already possesses all the answers. ‘According to this infantile prejudice, the master sets a problem, our task is to solve it, and the result is accredited true or false by a powerful authority.’ Such is the ‘grotesque image of culture that we find in examinations and government referenda as well as in newspaper competitions’ (Deleuze 1994: 158). But in the final analysis, the true master as emitter of signs is indeed an important role in education, one that Deleuze does not specify in an explicit fashion, but which can be extrapolated from Deleuze’s own practice as a teacher and his occasional remarks about the process of giving courses. The Deleuzian teacher, I hope to show, is both master and apprentice, a master apprentice engaged with the apprentice in their mutual apprenticeship in and through signs.
Deleuze spent most of his adult life teaching, with the exception of a four-year CNRS fellowship (1960–64) and one year of sick leave (1969–70). He began teaching at age twenty-three at the lycée d'Amiens (1948–52), followed by posts at the lycée d'Orléans (1953–55), the lycée Louis-le-Grand in Paris (1955–57), the Sorbonne (1957–60), the University of Lyon (1964–69), the University of Paris-VIII at Vincennes (1970–80), and Paris VIII at Saint Denis, following the government's destruction of the Vincennes site and relocation of the campus (1980–87). From the beginning, his students found him an exceptional teacher, whose primary pedagogical tool was the venerable lecture (and remained so throughout his career). Michel Marié, one of Deleuze’s Amiens students, recalls that

With him, philosophy wasn’t the severe discipline that I feared but an encounter, a fusion between a conceptual apparatus, a culture and its languages and learning techniques, its commentaries and links that you learn by reading generations of thinkers on one hand, and on the other hand, a sort of secret thrust, a mental attitude to perceive, to conceive of the simplest, most ordinary and yet most basic elements of existence. (cited in Dosse 2010: 101)

This notion of an encounter, and the dual focus on the history of philosophy and a prevailing mental attitude, are repeated time and again in accounts of Deleuze’s teaching, whether conducted in the humblest lycée or the most exalted university.

In the video Deleuze’s ABC Primer (L’abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze), Deleuze claims that his teaching never changed from the lycée to the university (Deleuze and Parnet 2004: ‘P as in Professor’), but it does seem that his sense of humour was more overtly displayed in the lycée context. Alain Roger, a student at the lycée d’Orléans, says that although ‘his courses were very arduous, based on a rigorous conception of philosophy and its history’, at the same time ‘he was hilarious, and this joking earned him the adoration of his students’ (Roger 2000: 36). Generally, Deleuze would enter the classroom, impeccably dressed, briefcase in hand, take a sheet of paper from his coat pocket, and then launch into an amusing story. Misadventures constantly betfell him in the commute from his Paris home to Orléans, and they often provided material for his anecdotes. Roger recalls one such account, in which Deleuze and a travelling salesman inadvertently picked up each other’s briefcases. Deleuze described his own puzzlement at discovering a plethora of Colgates and Palmolives (Roger 2000: 36) in his bag, and speculated on the panic the salesman would no doubt experience when
presenting clients with the *Critique of Pure Reason.* At the close of the anecdote, Deleuze lamented that he had thus lost his lecture notes, but concluded that he would proceed anyway— and then did so in a flawless, magisterial performance.

This strategy of appearing to be unprepared was one Deleuze used often at Orléans, and in all his other positions. Roger recalls that Deleuze ‘frequently gave the impression of having prepared nothing, expressing himself in a hesitant, uncertain fashion, as if unsure of himself’. He might begin ‘“Ah, there, you see ... the transcendental ... what is the transcendental? ... Well, obviously, Kant tells us that it’s the conditions of possibility of knowledge ... Yes ... Yes ... But why call this transcendental, why? ... I don’t know ... I don’t know ...”’ And then, following this stuttering introduction, Deleuze would gradually put everything in place, such that ‘at the end of an hour of what had seemed useless and blank gropings, Deleuze’s thought would rise, luminous ...’ (Roger 2010: 37).

When Deleuze advanced to a university position, he soon gained a large following of enthusiastic students. His Sorbonne lectures were filled to overflowing, and his popularity was sufficient to arouse the jealousy of colleagues. Olivier Revault d’Allonnes reports that ‘At three o’clock, when the course was over, everyone left, and the next professor, Raymond Polin, who taught in the same room, had six students. Utterly furious, he hated Deleuze’ (cited in Dosse 2010: 116). Similar crowds jammed his Tuesday morning seminars at Vincennes, ‘where the ritual was always the same. Deleuze arrived at a room already so packed with students that it was hard to get in the door. The place where Deleuze was supposed to sit was already filled with a forest of tape recorders’ (Dosse 2010: 356–7).

The Vincennes seminars seem to have been especially memorable, and several former students have attempted to capture the atmosphere of those courses. Pierre Blanchaud speaks of the ‘party atmosphere’ (Dosse 2010: 358) of the courses, which Philippe Mengue confirms, noting that at Vincennes in general there was ‘a climate of mad effervescence, a breath of total contestation, a wind of intellectual creation, of a liberation of mores and the imagination’ (Mengue 2000: 49). Pascal Criton remembers vividly the ‘encounter’ presented by the ‘peculiar climate of the seminars’:

the presence of the regulars, a mixture of all generations, the curious, those with a passion for philosophy, art, or those with a vaguer disposition—all this coalesced as a disparate, improbable composition. Were certain
The close of the lecture notes, but not in a flawless, Deleuze used recalls that occurred nothing, we are unsure of the accidental... But it’s not a... But why we don’t know..." would gradually become hour of what it would rise, soon gained another lecture was to arouse the atmosphere of that ‘At three o’clock next professor, but that it would rise, the ritual was to packed with atmosphere where Deleuze also crepe recorders’ memorable, and atmosphere of sphere’ (Dosse, noting that fervor, a sense of liberation, of a liberation, Pascal Criton familiar climate of curiosity, those other disposition –... Were certain audience members students, philosophers, writers, actors, musicians? Yes, no doubt, but their presence was circumspect, because they came to be fused with that thought of the imperceptible, which embodies the vital impulses of thought rather than branding it, which proceeds by hesitations, interrogations... A shared experience, almost a sotto voce island, adjacent to the intimacy of the work of thinking, the elaboration of thought in ‘real time’, distant from stupidity and sad passions; and then, beyond the silence created by this island, sinuously would become manifest Deleuze’s special craving to make things operational, to bestow on them the grace and necessity requisite for possible explorations of thought. (Crition 2007: 57)

Here again, the themes articulated by Deleuze’s first students – hesitations, interrogations, encounters with the thrust of thought, the action of thinking ‘in real time’.

For Philippe Mengue, the essence of Deleuze’s teaching was distilled in his voice, a voice that Mengue continues to discern faintly in Deleuze’s writings. The ABC Primer, says Mengue, conveys only weak hints of the charm and intensity of Deleuze’s voice, which were made fully present in the seminars alone.

A voice full of softness, but devoid of any flaccidity or pity, as is so often the case, free as well of that false amenity that poses as modesty the more easily to seize the opportunity of biting or stinging... In that firmness, a great firmness of thought, without a trace of rigidity, as if, in the tone of this flexible voice, were expressed the agility and subtlety of his mind, characteristics that allowed him to reject ready-made problems and to slip past static, obstructive contradictions. (Mengue 2000: 52)

In his work on Nietzsche, Deleuze stressed that affirmation does not mean blanket acceptance of everything, but must also include critique of the negative Will to Power; but that critical dimension, says Mengue, was scarcely evident in the seminars. Rather, Deleuze gave voice to the Nietzschean Yes ‘that precedes all negation, the affirmative yes’, leaving to others the critique of the philosophical priests of resentment. Deleuze’s ‘Yes’ took a particular form, one that for Mengue made incarnate the spirit of Deleuze’s thought.

When he began a seminar, or in the first moments of an encounter, when dealing with a question, Gilles Deleuze would respond with a Yes whose sound was an exaggerated suspension, prolonged, and then slowly, indefinitely diminished... And, in that moment of suspension, you suddenly saw all the possibilities of thought surge forth, light and free like birds, liberated from ponderous habits and mediocre objections. How welcomed you felt!
How intelligent you felt! The marvellous sensation of a sudden expansion of the space of thought, an opening to everything [une ouverture à tout], an open whole [un tout ouvert]. (Mengue 2000: 54)

In this suspended time, ‘everything could be said, and even non-sense became a weapon for thinking’ (Mengue 2000: 54).

Clearly, Deleuze put the standard lecture format to new use, imbuing it with a purpose beyond that of conveying information. The lecture functioned as an enactment of thought – fluid, halting, soft, yet thoroughly firm, intense and passionate. That intensity was not without humour, but its spirit resembled the playfulness of Lewis Carroll, rather than the biting satire and savage irony of Juvenal or Swift. And both the spontaneity and humour of the seminars were evident in the ludic pretence that Deleuze often offered of being thoroughly unprepared.

In fact, Deleuze put considerable effort in preparing his courses. François Dosse tells us that Deleuze attached enormous importance to his Tuesday seminar and spent most of the week preparing his class. Pierre Chevalier, a family friend who lived with the Deleuzes on rue Bizerte between 1973 and 1983, remembers the care Deleuze took in preparing the seminar for Vincennes. ‘I saw Gilles set to work on Sunday morning, sometimes on Saturday, polishing the seminar for three days and before he left to teach, there was a physical preparation, as if he were going to take part in a race. He would turn up on Tuesday mornings, no longer needing the little page of notes in his hand because he knew by heart what he was going to say. Yet he gave the impression of thinking on his feet, that his class was a pure improvisation of mental development in harmony with his public.’ (Dosse 2010: 354)

Given the thoroughness of Deleuze’s preparation, one might ask whether the seminars were genuine enactments of thought ‘in real time’, or mere performances, re-presentations of the act of thinking. A preliminary, hopelessly Platonic defence would be that, even if simple re-enactments, the seminars must have had as their models previous, original actions. But Deleuze himself indicates that the seminars were so carefully rehearsed in order to exceed the limits of preparation. In a 1988 interview, shortly after his retirement, Deleuze offered a rare glimpse into his conception of the seminars to which he devoted much of his life. ‘Giving courses has been a major part of my life, in which I’ve been passionately involved... It takes a lot of preparatory work to get a few minutes of inspiration. I was ready to stop when I saw it was taking more and more preparation to get a more taxing inspiration’ (Deleuze 1995: 139). Deleuze’s goal, then, was to make present, within
The seminar is also like a musical performance in another important sense. After describing the seminar as a kind of *Sprechgesang*, Deleuze reflects on the diverse audience he addressed at Vincennes. ‘It was there that I realized how much philosophy needs not only philosophical understanding, through concepts, but a nonphilosophical understanding, rooted in percepts and affects’ (Deleuze 1995: 139). In *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari associate percepts and affects most closely with the arts, arguing that just as philosophers invent concepts, so artists invent percepts and affects. Such percepts and affects are not personal perceptions and emotions, but anonymous, autonomous manifestations of the ‘being of sensation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 164), elements that permeate and pass through the individuals who serve as their vehicles. As *Sprechgesang*, the Deleuzian seminar aims to infuse concepts with percepts and affects, giving them a necessary intensity, resonance and harmony. It is this musical and philosophical essence that Mengue felt in the voice of Deleuze, a sonic materialisation of concepts, percepts and affects belonging no longer to Deleuze the individual, but to thought itself. In the language of *Difference and Repetition*, the voice had become an emission of signs, a trajectory passing through the singular points of the cadences and rhythms of performance.

Deleuze’s conception of the seminar as *Sprechgesang* has further implications concerning time and audience response, which he sketches
in his 1988 interview. Here Deleuze contrasts seminars and professional conferences, finding in the latter a time and atmosphere that inhibit genuine thought. Conferences consist of discrete, short lectures, followed by 'discussion', by which Deleuze means fractious debate. 'Philosophy has nothing to do with discussing things, it's difficult enough just understanding the problem someone's framing and how they're framing it' (Deleuze 1995: 139). The short duration of the conference paper is insufficient for understanding the specific problem under consideration, for which reason conferences give rise to battles over pre-established territories, forensic skirmishes that in no way foster co-participation in thought. By contrast, seminars 'have to be carried on over a long period with a relatively fixed audience, sometimes for a number of years. It's like a research laboratory [un laboratoire de recherche]: you give courses on what you're investigating [sur ce qu'on cherche], not on what you know' (1995: 139). Understanding problems proceeds in a slow rhythm, stretching well beyond the limits of a given seminar. At Vincennes, says Deleuze, there were 'long sessions [two and a half hours], nobody took in everything, but everyone took what they needed or wanted, what they could use, even if it was far removed from their discipline' (1995: 139). Only in this time of 'a long period of time' [une longue durée] could comprehension take the form of a musical accompaniment, in which intellectual understanding would become a matter of 'intensity, resonance, musical harmony' (1995: 86).

In the ABC Primer ('P as in Professor'), Deleuze distinguishes two basic conceptions of the seminar: one which aims at provoking an immediate audience response, soliciting questions, establishing a dialogue among the students and the teacher; and the model Deleuze followed, the traditional lecture, known in French as the cours magistral, the magisterial course, the course of the magister, the master (a name, Deleuze tells Parnet, with which he is not particularly happy). Deleuze claims that he used the cours magistral because that was what he had always done, but it was obviously a method well-suited to his talents. Essential to the cours magistral, as Deleuze conceived it, was an uninterrupted delivery, and in this sense, very much like a musical performance, during which the audience is expected to remain silent. Since the courses were so long and comprehension only occurred slowly, there necessarily would be stretches of time when students would be baffled, or lose their concentration, but questions at every juncture of confusion would only impede understanding. The point of the lecture was to allow students to drop out of the flow of words, to give them opportunities to rejoin the flow, and to encourage them to wait for illumination. As in a musical performance, some time later in the problem towards the end of the lecture, when the audience is 'exercised' (1988).

Clearly, one of the most significant and creating moments in Deleuze's thought became a particular form of co-participation. But what is the talk about? Deleuze has also devoted a Thousand Plates (1978), Spinoza (1989), These courses in considering the Dialectics of the History of Philosophy.

In Dialogues, Deleuze (1995) states:

The history of philosophy, and especially Greek philosophy, with its so-and-so's book manufactures and its chair twenty-one, is outside consideration. An image of the history of philosophy on which you think with Deleuze.

One might assume that the history of philosophy is a thing of the past. But for Deleuze, it is a present moment of thought. The object is to delineate a problem that gave
performance, says Deleuze, a phrase or motif may only become coherent later in the piece, so the elements of the seminar often coalesce only towards the end of the presentation, or perhaps days later. Deleuze notes that his best students asked their questions the week following the lecture, when they had allowed the temporality of the seminar experience to exercise to the full the power of its *longue durée*.

Clearly, one of Deleuze's goals in his seminars, and one that he met with considerable success, was that of performing the action of thinking and creating moments of inspiration during which the rehearsal of thought became thought 'in real time'. The pursuit of that goal suited a particular format, with its own temporality and mode of audience participation. But what of the content of his courses? What did he talk about? Deleuze gave lectures on the material in *Anti-Oedipus*, *A Thousand Plateaus*, *Cinema 1*, *Cinema 2* and *Francis Bacon*, but he also devoted several seminars to other philosophers, notably Kant (1978), Spinoza (1978, 1980, 1981) and Leibniz (1980 and 1986–87). These courses in the history of philosophy are especially important in considering the Deleuzian teacher as master apprentice.

In *Dialogues*, Deleuze speaks disparagingly of the traditional function of the history of philosophy:

The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even in thought. It has played the repressor's role: how can you think without having read Plato, Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, and so-and-so's book about them? A formidable school of intimidation which manufactures specialists in thought - but which also makes those who stay outside conform all the more to this specialism which they despise. An image of thought called philosophy has been formed historically and it effectively stops people from thinking. (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 13)

One might assume from this critique that Deleuze had no use for the history of philosophy, but a few pages later Deleuze explains that he found his way out of this repressive regime via philosophers who had escaped from philosophy's orthodox history 'in one respect, or altogether: Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson' (Deleuze and Parnet 2002: 14–15). In fact, as Deleuze explains in the *ABC Primer* ('H as in History of Philosophy'), the history of philosophy played an essential role in his own education.

For Deleuze, the history of philosophy is a form of portraiture in thought. The object of a historical study is to paint a philosopher's portrait by delineating the concepts he or she invented and to uncover the problem that gave rise to those concepts and to which they responded.
Throughout his life, Deleuze defined philosophy as the invention of concepts, an activity parallel to that of the painter, who creates with colour, the musician, who creates with sound, and the writer, who creates with words. But he insists in the ABC Primer that the invention of concepts is extremely difficult and requires considerable training if one is to succeed in that endeavour. Deleuze speaks of the great respect, awe, hesitation, and even fear and panic that Van Gogh and Gauguin felt when approaching colour. They were great colourists, but it took them years to feel capable of exploiting colour to the full, of being ‘worthy’ (digne) of creating with colour. Deleuze expresses a similar respect towards concepts, and in his books on Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson and Spinoza, he was gradually learning to master the art of concept creation by working with and through these master concept-creators. This ‘research into the concepts of others’, he says, constituted an ‘indispensable apprenticeship’ that allowed him eventually, in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, to attempt the invention of concepts himself, to feel worthy of such an enterprise. He regards as absurd the idea that one can simply start ‘doing philosophy’ without training in the history of philosophy, an absurdity equal to that of a writer who claims to have no time to read other writers and hence simply creates ex nihilo.

Thus Deleuze’s own development involved an extended apprenticeship, well beyond his years as a student, and in his seminars on Kant, Spinoza and Leibniz, he re-enacted that apprenticeship, and in the process led his students in their own training. Before creating concepts, one must know what concepts are, and one can only understand them by studying the concepts of the great masters. One must also comprehend the relationship between concepts and problems, a task even more difficult since problems are only hinted at, partially articulated, or at times completely tacit and hidden. Without an understanding of the problem, the concepts remain abstract; once situated in relation to the problem, however, everything becomes concrete. Plato’s ‘Idea’ is a genuine concept, Deleuze explains, which one may define as ‘something that is only what it is’. An actual mother, for example, is a wife, a sister, a friend and so on, but the Idea of ‘mother’ is nothing more than mother, a pure mother. But this concept remains vague and seems unmotivated until one understands the problem that led Plato to invent the concept of the Idea. The problem arose in the democratic city-state of Athens, and concerned the determination of the rights of claimants (prétendants) before various tribunals, legislative bodies or other venues for public decisions. Who is the genuine claimant? Who possesses the right to a given role, a given title, a given property? This problem, claims Deleuze,
forces Plato to invent the Idea of pure things – the Idea of Justice, Truth, the Good and so on, as pure things that are nothing more than what they are – in order to address the very concrete situation of adjudicating claimants and their petitions, of ranking the claimants according to the extent to which their claims approach the purity of a given standard.

Hence, when Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition* that teachers only teach by saying ‘do with me’, he is not downplaying the role of the teacher, but simply clarifying it. The teacher as emitter of signs does not provide apprentices with answers, but guides them in the art of discovering problems, an art that can only be mastered by practising it. Such practice is mysterious in its inner workings, and unpredictable in its effects. As Deleuze remarks in *Difference and Repetition*, ‘We never know in advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to think.’ As a result, ‘there is no more a method for learning that there is for finding treasures.’ Nevertheless, learning involves ‘a violent training, a culture or paideia which affects the entire individual’ (Deleuze 1994: 165). The violent training and paideia of philosophy take place in the workshop of the history of philosophy. There, the master apprentice offers apprentices encounters with the concepts and problems of great philosophers, as well as the processes of thought involved in their disclosure. Not a method, but an art, not a programme of study, but a rigorous discipline.

The seminar played a central role in Deleuze’s life as a teacher, but he also paid attention to individual students, fostering their development in accordance with the traditional master-apprentice relationship. In the *ABC Primer* (‘E is for Enfance’ [Childhood]), Deleuze himself singles out a certain Pierre Halwachs, a young teacher whom Deleuze met at age fourteen during an extended beach vacation at Deauville, as his first ‘maître’. Before meeting Halwachs, Deleuze was an indifferent student, but Halwachs introduced him to Gide, Anatole France, Baudelaire and other writers, and these encounters with Halwachs and great writers ‘completely transformed’ him. He grew passionate about learning, and during the ensuing fall term, when he studied philosophy, he discovered something important that he knew he would do the rest of his life.

Deleuze himself assumed the role of maître early in his career. At Amiens, when still in his twenties, he discovered that a student, Michel Morié, intended to become a worker-priest, but Deleuze insisted that he study philosophy. Morié persisted and did become a priest, but later followed Deleuze’s advice and studied at the Sorbonne (Dosse 2010: 107). Another Amiens student, Claude Lemoine, developed a love of
philosophy while in Deleuze's course, but Lemoine's parents planned that he follow in his father's footsteps and become a lawyer. Deleuze told Lemoine that he would not allow that to happen, and then asked to meet Lemoine's father, 'who agreed, unenthusiastically, and was finally persuaded that his son would study philosophy' (Dosse 2010: 102). At Orléans, Deleuze assumed an especially important role in the life of Alain Roger. Transformed by Deleuze's courses, Roger planned to pursue advanced study in philosophy, but disastrous year-end examinations in other subjects led him to question the viability of that career, and he contemplated instead pursuing his other passion and becoming a professional cyclist. He spoke with Deleuze about his decision, and Deleuze responded by taking Roger to the lycée library and removing three books: Epictetus' *Discussions*, Spinoza's *Ethics* and Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*. He then instructed Roger to prepare a class presentation according to these instructions: ‘You are going to look for the centre of gravity in this triangle, the intersection of the three medians, it’s easy’ (Dosse 2010: 104). Roger did not dare say no, and he spent the next few days feverishly reading and formulating his preparation. The exercise helped dislodge Roger from his cyclist plan. Later he wondered ‘how Deleuze was able to foresee that those three names were going to become my preferred authors for half a century’ (Dosse 2010: 104). During the ensuing four academic years, Deleuze drew up a rigorous programme of study for Roger and tutored him through regular discussions of his various assigned expositions of philosophical texts. Later, when Roger moved to Paris to study, he became friends with Deleuze, who, aware of Roger's lack of money, frequently took him out to eat. The winter of 1956, Roger was stricken with pleurisy and stuck in the lycée infirmary for several weeks, where, despite everything, I continued to work. Gilles came to see me and I don’t know whether, without him, I would not have surrendered to that adversity’ (Roger 2000: 40).

Such stories are touching, and one might view Deleuze's action simply as the caring attention of a decent human being, but there is more one may draw from this intense commitment to the master-apprentice relationship. These anecdotes provide evidence of Deleuze's conception of philosophy as more than mere thought, as a way of living that extends beyond the classroom. It is important, however, to recognise that in serving as a master to apprentices Deleuze was not recruiting disciples. Even when he had become a prominent philosopher, he always scorned the cultivation of acolytes and the project of building a Deleuzian ‘school of thought’. In the *ABC Primer* ('P as in Professor'), Deleuze tells Parner with a smile that he never had disciples because no one wanted to follow him, and then says: 

A school, he says, should be, for example, was a school and so on, whereas Deleuze desisted from such an action, a movement through his depravity its participants, the ultimate aims of his teaching with their solitude and applicable in diverse00: 40).

The master-apprentice relationship is one of existence, and, I would argue, ethics. In *The Logic of Sense* (1988), Deleuze asserts that to be worthy of the event, a school must be an example of such work, not by a bullet and yet refuse to have a single goal: to become will and release the event of worthiness with Nietzschean resentment, and given of this ethics primarily of becoming worthy of the event and the essence of learning. True, Deleuze says that thought, but it is also in order to actively become world, also work to create encounter the ongoing encounters, to think as 'mediators' in Deleuze's words. In Deleuze's courses, Deleuze provides that they then must become mediators, Deleuze again is being loyal and adulation, but and thereby help his apprentices to actively fashion their own worlds.

In some ways, Deleuze could be described as a master of a Japanese martial art, archery, when the sensei enters into a bond that she...
follow him, and then speaks of the ‘awful’, ‘terrible’ notion of a ‘school’. A school, he says, should be contrasted with a ‘movement’. Surrealism, for example, was a school, with a leader, tribunals, grudges, expulsions and so on, whereas Dada was a ‘movement’, with no orthodoxy, no structure, no collective purpose other than the pursuit of art in heterogeneous directions. If anything, he would have liked to have engendered a movement through his teaching. The ideal of such a movement would disperse its participants, not bring them together, since for Deleuze, the ultimate aims of his teaching, he says, are (1) to help students ‘be happy with their solitude’ and (2) to provide students with pliable concepts, applicable in diverse spheres, such that each student, in his or her solitude, may encounter something that stimulates genuine thought.

The master-apprentice relationship in philosophy is part of a mode of existence, and, I would argue, understandable in terms of Deleuze’s ethics. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze expounds on the Stoic notion of being worthy of the event, a concept that he himself embraces. He offers as an example of such worthiness Joe Bousquet, who had been paralysed by a bullet and yet refused to lament his misfortune. This Stoic ethics has a single goal: ‘to become worthy of what happens to us, and thus to will and release the event’ (Deleuze 1990a: 149). Deleuze identifies this worthiness with Nietzsche’s *amor fati* and the rejection of all forms of *resentment*, and given the example of Bousquet, one might conceive of this ethics primarily in terms of a reaction to what befalls us. But being worthy of the event is more than this. An event is an encounter, and the essence of learning, as well as thinking, resides in encounters. True, Deleuze says that thought only begins with a violence external to thought, but it is also important to do something with such violence, actively to become worthy of the encounters that occur. And one may also work to create encounters, to seek others with whom we may build ongoing encounters, to find what Deleuze calls ‘*intercesseurs*’ (translated as ‘mediators’ in Deleuze 1995: 121), such as he found in Guattari. In his courses, Deleuze provides encounters for his students, events of which they then must become worthy. And as a master to individual apprentices, Deleuze again is being worthy of the event, not seeking affection, loyalty or adulation, but endeavouring to create individual encounters and thereby help his apprentices themselves become intercessors who actively fashion their own encounters.

In some ways, Deleuze’s practice as a teacher resembles that of the master of a Japanese martial art. For example, in *kyudo*, the Zen art of archery, when the *sensei*, or master, accepts students, the apprentices enter into a bond that should last for a lifetime. The *sensei*’s concerns for
the students extend to all aspects of their lives. The sensei has reached a state of mastery by passing through all the stages of a rigorous apprenticeship, a disciplinary practice through which the sensei then guides the students. Students learn the eight basic postures of kyudo and practise them for years, gradually perfecting them and integrating them with breathing techniques and the regulation of mental activity that allows full concentration. The postures, breathing techniques and mental exercises, however, are only means to an end. Kyudo distinguishes between ri, or skill, and ji, or inspiration. Ri involves discipline, repetition and specific configurations of mind and body, but ji is allied to genuine mastery of the principles of the art of kyudo.

Understanding the principles underlying a Zen art is not based on cognitive or intellectual understanding. Rather it is based on an intuitive awareness of the underlying principles of the Universe as they apply to that particular art . . . The philosophy of teaching in the Zen arts is to teach underlying principles through the repetitive practice of techniques. The techniques of the arts represent formalizations of the masters’ understandings of the principles. They can be seen as approximations of the underlying principles . . . Each student ultimately must see into those underlying principles by himself. This can only be done by endless repetition of the eight stages of kyudo. (Kushner 2000: 17)

Kyudo means literally ‘the way of the bow’, do being the suffix that means ‘way’ (the Japanese equivalent of the Chinese ‘tao’). Hence, the designation of karate as karatedo, the way of the empty hand, or the Zen art of sword fighting as kendo, the way of the sword. The various ways of the martial arts, as well as the art of writing (shodo), the art of tea (chado), and so on, are ‘fractional expressions of Zen in limited fields . . . These actions become Ways when practice is not done merely for the immediate result but also with a view to purifying, calming and focusing the psycho-physical apparatus, to attain to some degree of Zen realization and express it’ (Leggett 1978: 117). The final goal, then, is to go ‘beyond technique, and indeed beyond thought’ (Leggett 1978: 118) and reach a point at which the ri of technique gives way to the ji of inspiration.

The ri of philosophy, its ensemble of skills and techniques, is the history of philosophy. The ji of philosophy is the inspiration that arises in the process of creating concepts. The discipline of philosophy, ‘a violent training, a culture or paideia which affects the entire individual’ (Deleuze 1994: 163), gradually takes shape through the collective practices of former masters of the art, such as Plato, Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson, each master adding something to the ri of the ‘way’ of philosophy. The history of philosophy offers insights into the problems of philosophy, but only as an event that they will be all-pervasive of existence, of life. Philosophy interferes, it signs. The master is humble, but a master is no less a realization of thought than the philosophy and conduct of philosophy. The master is hesitant, prone (entretemps), the possibility of it inseparable from the ji of philosophy, a perpetual enumeration of masters and apprentices.

Notes
1. There is no text.
2. There is no text.
3. There is no text.

philosophy.
The Master Apprentice

As has reached a
various appren-
ticeship, guides
and practice
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philosophy, a
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mental exer-
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petition and
ial to genuine

philosophy. The master trains apprentices in the workshop of the
history of philosophy, sometimes conducting group lessons, sometimes
offering individual instruction. The master discloses the concepts and
problems of past philosophers, and in the process models the activity of
philosophical thought. Apprentices must undergo this rigorous paideia,
but only as a means of commencing a true apprenticeship in signs, one
that they will pursue on their own until, perhaps, they master the 'way'
of philosophy and manage to find the ji of philosophical creation.
How this will happen, when, or by what means is mysterious, beyond any
method or programme. But if such mastery is attained, its effects will
be all-pervasive. The 'way' of philosophy is a way of living, a mode
of existence, and like the way of Zen, one that applies to all aspects of
life.

Philosophy's way is that of the event, the encounter, the forceful
interference, intercession, reverberation and resonance of signs meeting
signs. The master, as producer of signs, is filled with a lightness, a gentle
humour, but also with a passionate intensity. When producing signs, the
master is no longer a human being, but a selfless, a-personal concen-
tration of thought itself, an amalgam of concepts, percepts and affects.
In the philosophy seminar, the material vehicle of thought is the voice,
and conducting a cours magistral is nothing other than giving voice to
philosophy. The master's enunciation of the way is the affirmative Yes,
hesitant, prolonged, suspended in time, in an intermezzo, a meanwhile
(entretemps), a between-time, a floating time that opens towards the
possibility of something new. It is in this Yes, a single sign of all signs,
insensible from the asignifying matter of the master's Sprechgesang,
that the ji of philosophy, its inspiration, appears. At that moment, the
master apprentice discloses the essence of teaching, the way towards
a perpetual encounter with signs, an ongoing apprenticeship in which
masters and apprentices alike continue to learn from the world.

Notes
1. There is no transcription of Deleuze's remarks in the ABC Primer available in
print. Charles Stivale informs me that Deleuze's estate declined to grant permi-
sion for such a transcription (personal communication). Stivale has, however,
written an invaluable detailed synopsis of the seven-hour video and has made it
accessible on the internet (Stivale 2000).
2. In the ABC Primer, Deleuze tells Parnet that he once taught a lycée lesson by
playing a musical saw, a pedagogical technique, one must assume, that he aban-
doned at the university level.
3. In the ABC Primer, Parnet asks Deleuze if he goes to art exhibits or films in
the pursuit of culture, and he says no, that he is simply seeking encounters. She
then asks if he ever goes to films for entertainment rather than 'work', and he
replies that it’s not a matter of work, but of being alert, looking for something disturbing, amusing, stirring, anything that has the energy of something ‘passing’, something in the process of becoming-other. This vigilance is not restricted to the realm of the arts, he suggests, but informs all of his experience. And indeed, given the wide range of subjects Deleuze addresses in his books, it is evident that the ‘way’ of philosophical encounters is one that he pursued in all aspects of his life.

References


